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BILINGUAL INTERPRETATION OF 
ENACTMENTS IN CANADA: 
PRINCIPLES V. PRACTICE 
Pierre-André Côté* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
anada’s experience with the interpretation of bilingual 
laws goes back a long way.  For example, the Civil Code 
of Lower Canada, which came into force in 1866, contained a 
provision to guide interpreters in the resolution of problems 
caused by differences in the French and English versions of the 
Code.1  Canadian courts have established a method for dealing 
with problems of interpretation of bilingual laws by building on 
the experience of many generations of jurists.  
Anyone wishing to become familiar with the interpretive 
method would normally turn to a textbook on statutory inter-
pretation, like my colleague Ruth Sullivan’s excellent fourth 
edition of Elmer Driedger’s Construction of Statutes.2  Professor 
Sullivan provides an accurate description of the way bilingual 
statutes ought to be interpreted, based on numerous judicial 
dicta and decisions, most from the Supreme Court of Canada 
  
 * Professor, Université de Montréal.  The author was born in Montréal, 
Québec, Canada and holds degrees from the University of Montréal (B.A. 
1964; LL.L 1967) and the Université de Toulouse, France (D.E.S. 1969).  Since 
1970, he has been Professor of Law at the University of Montréal.  He has 
taught and published mainly in Administrative Law, Statutory Interpretation 
and Transitional Law.  Admitted to the Québec Bar in 1968, he is presently 
counsel in the Montréal law firm of Bélanger, Sauvé.  
    1  Civil Code of Lower Canada § 2615 (1866) (Can.): 
If in any article of this code founded on the laws existing at the time 
of its promulgation, there be a difference between the English and 
French text, that version shall prevail which is most consistent with 
the provisions of the existing laws on which the article is founded; 
and if there be any such difference in an article changing the existing 
laws, that version shall prevail which is more consistent with the in-
tention of the article, and the ordinary rules of legal interpretation 
shall apply in determining such intention. 
Id. 
 2. RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
STATUTES (4th ed. 2002). 
C 
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and some going back to the 19th century.3  As accurate as that 
description may be, however, I believe Professor Sullivan would 
agree that it does not necessarily reflect how bilingual legisla-
tion is actually interpreted in day-to-day legal practice in Can-
ada.  In fact, there are few areas of Canadian law where the 
contrast between “law in the books” and “law in practice” is 
more obvious.  
While applicable legal principles require a bilingual reading 
and interpretation of bilingual legislation, practitioners are 
usually satisfied with an unilingual approach to bilingual texts.  
The purpose of this Article is to substantiate and illustrate this 
assertion and to examine some of the reasons for this situation.  
To do so, it will first summarize briefly the legal principles gov-
erning the interpretation of bilingual legislation in Canada, and 
then examine the various ways in which legal practice deviates 
from these principles. 
A.  Principles 
Canadian courts have, over the years, developed principles of 
interpretation addressing the unique challenges presented by 
legal norms enacted in two different but equal linguistic ver-
sions.  From these principles flow a method for interpreting bi-
lingual texts, which can be presented through four methodologi-
cal principles. 
1.  First principle: Bilingual statutes  
should be given a bilingual interpretation. 
The Canadian Parliament enacts legal texts, not legal norms.  
The rules or norms have to be constructed by the readers of 
those texts, taking into account numerous factors, starting, of 
course, with the text of the law.  This process of constructing 
legal norms which starts by reviewing the text of the law is 
what I mean by “interpretation.”  
Since both linguistic versions of bilingual legislation consti-
tute authentic expressions of the law (in effect, it might be bet-
ter to say that they form together but one bilingual and authori-
  
 3. See id. at 73, 94. 
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tative text of the law),4 someone cannot claim to correctly inter-
pret a bilingual legislative text if they ignore one half of the text 
being interpreted. Thus, bilingual legislation requires bilingual 
interpretation, that is, an interpretation that takes into account 
the complete text of the law, which includes both an English 
and a French version.5 
If we could be sure that there were no discrepancies between 
the two versions, we could arguably make do with an unilingual 
approach to bilingual texts.  Since these discrepancies are pre-
sent and even unavoidable, the only conclusion is that the best 
and most prudent way to interpret bilingual legislation is to 
consider both versions. 
2.  Second principle: In interpreting bilingual statutes, both  
versions should be attributed the same importance or weight. 
Not only are both versions of a bilingual statute or regulation 
authentic, they are also to be considered as equally authentic.6  
Equality of both versions carries, of course, enormous symbolic 
significance: neither French nor English speakers want to be 
considered second class citizens.  On a more practical level, 
what has been called the “equal authenticity rule” states that 
both versions should contribute equally to the meaning of a 
given provision. 7  For example, even if one version is known to 
  
 4. See, e.g., Roderick A. MacDonald, Legal Bilingualism, 42 MCGILL L.J. 
119, 160–61 (1997):   
Just as drafters of bilingual legislation are engaged in the translation 
of a single juridical idea into two natural languages, interpreters 
would come to accept that knowledge of one version alone is an insuf-
ficient point of reference for understanding the idea in question.  
They would understand legislative texts as fully embracing both Eng-
lish and French connotations and contexts, and as necessarily mean-
ing what both versions say.  No longer would it be possible to speak of 
two texts being equally authoritative.  To the extent that any formu-
lation of a legal rule can be authoritative, it will be necessary to 
speak of one authoritative bilingual text in French and English. 
Id. 
 5. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 77-78. 
 6. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 74–77 (emphasis added). See also R v. 
Cie Imm. BCN Ltee, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865, 871 (acknowledging that § 8(1) of the 
1970 Official Languages Act specified that both English and French versions 
of legislative enactments were “equally authentic”).  
 7. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 74–77. 
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be simply a translation of the other, this is not, per se, an ac-
ceptable reason to give it less consideration. 
3. Third principle: Discrepancies in the two versions are  
to be treated as any other ambiguity and, subject  
to the fourth principle, must be resolved by resorting  
to the usual method of interpretation. 
Where the reading of both the French and English versions 
reveals differences of meaning, the problem should be ap-
proached as a problem of ambiguity.  Even though, there are 
two linguistic versions, there can be but one valid rule associ-
ated with a given provision in relation to particular facts.  A 
choice thus has to be made, and the version to be favored will be 
determined by taking into account all the factors usually rele-
vant to the ascertainment of statutory meaning.  In the conven-
tional rhetoric of statutory interpretation, it is said that the 
version which best reflects the “intention of Parliament” should 
prevail.8 
The “literal meaning” of each version still retains some rele-
vance, in that the words used in both versions of the provision 
being interpreted will determine the semantic possibilities of 
the text.9  The “ordinary” or “technical” meaning, however,  
cannot be a factor in the selection of the best interpretation be-
cause, in cases of divergence, both versions, being of equal 
weight, cancel each other out as it were, at least at the textual 
level.10 
4.  Fourth principle: In case of discrepancies, the meaning 
shared by both versions, if one can be found, constitutes a factor 
which should be considered in the interpretation of the provi-
sion, in addition to all the other relevant factors. 
When the two versions do not express the same thing, one 
should try to reconcile them.  In order to do that, Canadian 
courts will look for the meaning that can be attributed indis-
  
 8. Doré v. Verdun (City of), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, 879.  See SULLIVAN, supra 
note 2, 87–90.  
 9. See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 74–77.  
 10. See id. 
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tinctively to the two versions, the meaning which is shared by 
the two, the meaning that is common to both of them.11 
Sometimes, such a meaning cannot be found, and the inter-
preter will have to forgo textual considerations and resort to 
other means of resolving the ambiguity.12  In other cases, one 
version is ambiguous, equivocal, and the other is clear, un-
equivocal.13  The clear version should be preferred.  In a third 
category of instances, one version has wider meaning than the 
other: the version with the narrower meaning, which is shared 
by both versions, would then be favoured.14 
When a shared meaning can be found, it constitutes merely a 
supplemental factor in the search for the best meaning of the 
provision.  It will, however, be ignored if it is felt that it does 
not correctly reflect the intention of Parliament.15 
The four principles just described would most likely be fol-
lowed today by the Supreme Court of Canada in attributing 
meaning to a bilingual statute.  Interpretation, however, is not 
a monopoly of the Supreme Court’s.   Interpretation is part of 
the every day activities of jurists, and there are many reasons 
to believe that the method required by these principles is sel-
dom followed in practice.  
B. Practice 
When a subject has been as well studied as the legally ac-
cepted method for interpreting bilingual legislation in Canada,16 
research is made easy.  The situation is different when dealing 
with law in practice.  Unless you can rely on empirical research, 
the task is a lot more difficult.   
To my knowledge, such empirical research into the interpre-
tive practices of Canadian jurists simply does not exist.  This 
absence is in itself surprising.  Could it be that, as proud as we 
Canadians may be of the principles our courts have developed, 
  
 11. See id. at 81–87. 
 12. Id. at 90–92.  
 13. Id. at 82–83. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 87–90. 
 16. See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 2; see generally RÉMI MICHAEL 
BEAUPRÉ, INTERPRETING BILINGUAL LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1986); see generally 
PIERRE-ANDRE CÔTÉ, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA 323–32 
(Katherine Lippel & Douglas J. Simsovic trans., 3d ed. 2000).   
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we are a bit embarrassed by the way these principles are in ef-
fect implemented in day-to-day legal practice?  English-French 
bilingualism is a touchy matter in Canada, and certain subjects 
may be thought to be better left untouched.17   
Absent such empirical research, I have had to draw, for this 
Article, on some 40 years of experience first as a law student 
and later as a lawyer and law professor in Montréal, on conver-
sations with colleagues at the Université de Montréal and at 
the law firm with which I am associated and, obviously, I have 
drawn also on what I could find in books, essentially in law re-
ports and law review articles.  In a country as vast and diverse 
as Canada, this approach is obviously flawed in some way.  One 
can safely say, for example, that the interpretation of bilingual 
legislation is bound to be conducted differently in Montréal and 
Toronto.  One takes place in a largely bilingual environment 
where the majority is French-speaking and the other in a 
largely unilingual English-speaking community.18  Again, the 
day-to-day practice of bilingual interpretation by different ju-
rists in the same linguistic, social and cultural environment 
may vary considerably as a function of individual linguistic 
skills and areas of practice. 
My point of view is thus based largely on experience, intuition 
and educated guesses.  This Article proposes hypotheses for fur-
ther empirical research.  I hope that, even in this form, it will 
be found useful. 
In my opinion, the method of interpretation suggested by the 
four principles described earlier is seldom applied in Canadian 
legal practice.  By legal practice, I am not referring only to in-
terpretation by the courts: every time a meaning is attributed to 
an enactment by its reader, the text is being interpreted. Bilin-
gual legislative texts are rarely interpreted in Canada accord-
ing to the method identified by the courts as the method to be 
followed. 
  
 17. See, e.g., Thomas W. Simon, Minorities in International Law, 10 CAN. 
J.L. & JURIS. 507, 518 (1997). 
 18. See Statistics Canada, Population by Knowledge of Official Language, 
Census Metropolitan Areas (2001), available at http://www.statcan.ca/english/ 
Pgdb/demo19b.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).  In Montréal, 53% of the popu-
lation knows both official languages and 91% of the population speaks French.  
Id.  In Toronto, only 8% of the population knows both official languages and 
96% of the population speaks English.  Id. 
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The deviations from the principles observed in practice take 
essentially three distinct forms.  There are many reasons to be-
lieve that, in the majority of instances, only one version is con-
sidered.  This approach reflects what has been called “legal du-
alism.”19  In other instances, the version which is not the one in 
day-to-day use will be viewed only as an aid to interpretation.  
This is what I will call “occasional bilingualism.”  Finally, when 
the two versions are considered, they may not be accorded the 
same weight.  I will call this “unequal bilingualism.”   
1.  Legal dualism 
The term “legal dualism” was used by Roderick MacDonald to 
describe a situation where official bilingualism translates, in 
practice, into two legal unilingualisms.20  Paradigmatic in-
stances of this situation would be an English-speaking lawyer 
in Vancouver using exclusively the English version of the 
Criminal Code of Canada, a bilingual federal statute, or a 
French-speaking lawyer in Québec City relying exclusively on 
the French version of the Civil Code of Québec, a bilingual Qué-
bec law.  The method of interpretation favoured by this ap-
proach is simple: choose one version of the statute…and adhere 
to it, regardless of the outcome.  The “other version” is com-
pletely ignored, creating a unilingual interpretation of a bilin-
gual text. 
At no time in my career have I been made more aware of legal 
dualism than one morning a little more than 20 years ago while 
I was preparing a lecture on a Supreme Court of Canada deci-
sion that was to become probably the leading case in modern 
Canadian Administrative Law.21  The case dealt with the ques-
tion of judicial control of interpretations, by an administrative 
agency, of the statute the administrative agency was entrusted 
to apply.  The Supreme Court decided that the text interpreted 
by the agency was ambiguous (there were, in the opinion of the 
Court, at least four different interpretations that could be sus-
tained), that there was not one interpretation that could be said 
to be “right” and that since the conclusion arrived at by the 
agency was not “so patently unreasonable that its construction 
  
 19. See MacDonald, supra note 4, at 154. 
 20. Id. 
 21. C.U.P.E. v. N.B. Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227. 
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cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation,” in-
tervention by the Court was not warranted. 22 
Since I teach in French, I naturally was preparing my lecture 
by reading the French version of the Court’s decision, which 
contained the official French version of the Province of New-
Brunswick statute being interpreted.23  Reading the French ver-
sion many times, I simply could not find the ambiguity at the 
center of the controversy, and for good reason: the French text 
was unequivocal…but nobody seemed to have noticed, not even 
the members of the Supreme Court. 
It is true that case was decided 24 years ago and a unilingual 
reading of a bilingual statute would certainly not happen today 
at the Supreme Court level.  Recent experience shows, however, 
that it is still the practice of some lawyers and judges, even at 
the appellate level, to rely on one version only.  In the recent 
case R. v. Mac,24 the Supreme Court of Canada, realized that 
the French version of the Criminal Code of Canada (a federal 
and thus bilingual statute) had not been considered in the 
courts below.  The Court rescheduled the hearing in order for 
the parties to make submissions taking into account the French 
version.  The Court eventually ruled by giving considerable 
weight to that version.   
To reduce the possibility of parties before the Supreme Court 
simply ignoring one version of a bilingual legislative text, the 
new Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada enacted in April 
2002 now require the reproduction in the factum and in the 
book of authorities of both versions of all legislative texts that, 
by law, have to be printed in both languages.25  When the Su-
preme Court has to resort to its rule-making powers in order to 
incite litigants to take into account both versions of bilingual 
legislative texts, one can easily imagine what goes on in every-
day legal practice. 
Among the causes of legal dualism, MacDonald identifies 
what he calls “rampant unilingualism among legal elites.”26  To 
  
 22. Id. at 237. 
 23. This official nature of the French version flowed at the time from the 
Official Languages of New Brunswick Act, R.S.N.B. ch. O.1 (1973)(Can.). 
 24. R. v. Mac, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 856. 
 25. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/DORS/2002-156, C.Gaz., 
pt. II, vol. 136, no. 9, s. 42(2)(b) (April 24, 2002). 
 26. MacDonald, supra note 4, at 156. 
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interpret bilingually bilingual texts, it evidently helps to have 
at least a passive knowledge of French and English.  As the fol-
lowing table published by Statistics Canada indicates,27 bilin-
gualism in Canada is generally not at a high level, except in the 
two provinces of Québec and New-Brunswick, where members 
of the French-speaking minority are concentrated.   
 
English-French Bilingualism 
 1971 1981 1991 2001 
Canada 13.4% 15.3 16.3 17.7 
Newfoundland  
and Labrador 
1.8 2.3 3.3 4.1 
Prince Edward  
Island 
8.2 8.1 10.1 12.0 
Nova Scotia 6.7 7.4 8.6 10.1 
New Brunswick 21.5 26.5 29.5 34.2 
Québec 27.6 32.4 35.4 40.8 
Ontario 9.3 10.8 11.4 11.7 
Manitoba 8.2 7.9 9.2 9.3 
Saskatchewan 5.0 4.6 5.2 5.1 
Alberta 5.0 6.4 6.6 6.9 
British Columbia 4.6 5.7 6.4 7.0 
Yukon Territory 6.6 7.9 9.3 10.1 
Northwest  
Territories 
6.1 6.0 6.1 8.3 
Nunavut – – – 3.8 
 
A comparison of metropolitan areas by language of population 
confirms the vast differences between, for example, Toronto, 
where the level of bilingualism stands at 8%, Vancouver, where 
7.5% of the population is bilingual and Montréal, where bilin-
gualism stands at 53%.28 
  
 27. Statistics Canada, 2001 Census, English-French Bilingualism,      
available at www.12.statsca/english/census01/teacher’s_kit/activity8_table5. 
cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
 28. Statistics Canada, 2001 Census, Population by knowledge of official 
language, census metropolitan areas, available at www.statscan.ca/english/ 
Pgdb/demo19b.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).  
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Now, one may argue that these statistics do not reveal the 
level of bilingualism in the legal profession, where, it can be 
surmised, practitioners tend to be more educated and bilingual-
ism more important considering, in particular, its role in legis-
lation.  It is not easy to obtain information about the language 
characteristics of the Canadian legal profession.  The best I 
have been able to do is to look at the membership of the Cana-
dian Institute for the Administration of Justice,29 which, as of 
August 26, 2003, had 1,054 members, 55% of which are judges 
of various Courts in Canada, the rest being essentially members 
of the Bar from across Canada. 
Among those 1,054 members, 799 (76%) declare themselves to 
be English-speaking.  Of that number, 46, or 6%, are bilingual.  
Of the 255 French-speaking members (24% of the total mem-
bership), 161 or 63% are bilingual. The hypothesis that bilin-
gualism is more frequent in the legal profession than in the 
general population is true of the French-speaking jurists, but 
not for the English speakers.30  
The nature of the tools Canadian practitioners use on a daily 
basis to access the text of legislation constitutes a cause as well 
as a consequence of legal dualism.  In English Canada, the 
French version tends to be omitted from annotated codes and 
statutes.  If you open, for example, any edition of the celebrated 
Martin’s Annual Criminal Code,31 you will not find anywhere 
the French version of the Criminal Code or of related statutes, 
although all were bilingually drafted, adopted and published, 
and even though those texts are all supposed to be subject to a 
bilingual method of interpretation.  The same could be said for 
most annotated federal or constitutional statutes published in 
English Canada.32   
  
 29. For more information on the Canadian Institute for the Administration 
of Justice, see http://www.ciaj-icaj.ca. 
 30. I wish to thank Mrs. Christine Robertson, executive director of Cana-
dian Institute for the Administration of Justice for this information. 
 31. EDWARD L. GREENSPAN, Q.C. & MARC ROSENBERG, MARTIN’S ANNUAL 
CRIMINAL CODE 2004 (2004). 
 32. See, e.g., L. W. HOULDEN & GEOFFREY B. MORAWETZ, THE 2003 
ANNOTATED BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT (2003); MAHMUD JAMAL & 
MATTHEW TAYLOR, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS IN LITIGATION  (2003).  
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French-speaking authors tend to publish federal and Québec 
codes and statutes in both languages,33 although there are more 
and more exceptions.34  In 1977, the Québec government ceased 
to publish the French and the English versions of its statutes 
side-by-side, so bilingual interpretation of Québec statutes has 
since then become more difficult. However, commercial publica-
tions of bilingual editions of the Civil Code, of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and of other statutes in some measure alleviate the 
problems created by the physical separation of the French and 
English versions in governmental publications. 
When a lawyer works in daily practice with the unilingual 
text of a bilingual statute, an interpretation process resting on 
both official versions is not necessarily excluded, but chances 
are that approach will not be resorted to except where special 
circumstances require it.  I call this “occasional bilingualism.” 
2.  Occasional bilingualism 
Interpretive principles require that bilingual interpretation 
be systematic.  Since both versions should serve as a starting 
point for construction of legal norms, both have to be taken into 
account every time a statute is given meaning.  In everyday 
practice, however, and this certainly characterizes the approach 
dominant in the bilingual environment of Montréal, only one 
version is in daily use and the other version is looked at occa-
sionally, when special circumstances seem to justify it.  This 
happens, notably, when there is a need for confirmation of the 
meaning of the dominant version, or when that version’s mean-
ing is doubtful and requires clarification.  It goes without saying 
that this approach is encouraged when the French and English 
versions are not published side-by-side, but in separate docu-
ments. 
The law firm where I act as counsel has an important mu-
nicipal law practice.  Municipal legislation is within the juris-
diction of the province.35  Québec municipal legislation is first 
  
 33. See, e.g., YVON MARTINEAU, MANUEL DES CORPORATIONS DU QUÉBEC 
[MANUAL OF QUÉBEC CORPORATIONS] (1994); GEORGE T. ROBIC, ET. AL. 
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT ACT ANNOTATED (2003).  
 34. See, e.g., THERIAULT & FORTIN, DROIT DES VALEURS MOBILIÈRES [THE 
LAW OF TRANSFERABLE SECURITIES ] (2001). 
 35. Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30-31 Vict., ch. 3, s. 92(8).   
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drafted in French and then translated into English.36  Lawyers 
practicing municipal law tell me that they tend to use the 
French version in daily practice, but, since they are generally 
bilingual, that they will turn to the English version only when 
special circumstances justify it. 
There is reason to think that this opportunistic use of bilin-
gualism is not limited to Québec jurists.  Many years ago, as I 
was reading a law review article about the interpretation of the 
then recently enacted Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms,37 I was shocked to read that, among the sources the au-
thor said one could look at to assist in the interpretation of the 
Charter, the French version of the Charter figured in sixth 
place!38  This is especially troubling, considering that the Eng-
lish and French versions of the Charter are declared to be 
“equally authoritative” by Section 57 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.39   
The recourse to the other version simply as an aid to inter-
pretation can be criticized as not being compatible with the 
equal authenticity rule, but one wonders whether a systematic 
bilingual approach is possible in daily legal practice.  Even 
where knowledge of both official languages is not an obstacle to 
a bilingual method, it seems that, inevitably, one version will 
tend to dominate and the other will be relegated to an auxiliary 
role.  This reflects a kind of practitioner’s custom or working 
habit which is very hard to change.  If we take as an example 
the interpretation of Québec municipal legislation, the statutes 
are drafted in Québec City in French in a French-speaking en-
vironment.40 The texts are discussed in the Québec National 
  
 36. LUC GAGNÉ, LE PROCESSUS LÉGISLATIF ET RÉGLEMENTAIRE AU QUÉBEC 
[THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS IN QUÉBEC] 29–31 (Yvon Blais ed., 
1997).  Nicole Fernbach, Getting the Message Across in Languages Other than 
English: The Canadian example [sic], Presentation to the Fourth Biennieal 
Conference of the PLAIN Language Association International (September 27, 
2002) at http://www.nald.ca/PROVINCE/ONT/PLAIN/message/1.htm. 
 37. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms).   
 38. Robin Elliot, Interpreting the Charter—Use of Earlier Versions as an 
Aid U.B.C.L. REV. (Charter Edition) 11, 12–13 (1982). 
 39. CAN CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. VII (Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms), §57.  
 40. GAGNÉ, supra note 36, at 29–31.  
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Assembly in their French version only. 41  The English version is 
a translation.  The practitioner working with the French ver-
sion of the Cities and Town’s Act,42 for example, knows this.  
What is the incentive to look systematically at the English ver-
sion?  Either it says the same thing as the French, and it may 
be seen as useless, or it contradicts the French, and it is possi-
ble that the French version will be preferred by a court as being 
the original and thus best version.   
One thing seems sure: if occasional bilingualism did not work 
well in practice, it would very likely be abandoned.  Occasional 
bilingualism may be an error, but error communis facit jus.  The 
same could be said of the unilingual interpretation of bilingual 
texts in many parts of Canada: as long as everybody in a given 
milieu ignores the French or the English version, there is no 
real practical problem. 
I have just hinted at the possibility that the Québec Courts 
may favour the original version of a statute over its translation.  
This illustrates the third manner in which practice may deviate 
from principles. 
3.  Unequal bilingualism 
The French and English versions of Canadian bilingual legis-
lation are supposed to be equally authoritative.43  To this equal-
ity at the normative level, however, does not always correspond 
an equality at the factual level.   
For example, it would seem obvious that when a text was first 
conceived in one linguistic version, then drafted, discussed in 
Parliament and adopted in that version, the other version being 
simply a translation of the final draft, more weight in interpre-
tation to the version considered as the original will usually be 
given.  As Roderick MacDonald points out, legal bilingualism is 
not really compatible with the production of dual versions by a 
process of translation.44  Even when both versions have been 
drafted as originals, the simple fact that the ministerial in-
  
 41. Debates of the Québec National Assembly can be consulted at 
www.assnat.qc.ca. 
 42. City and Towns Act, R.S.Q., ch. C-19 (Can.).  
 43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the equal authen-
ticity rule). 
 44. See MacDonald, supra note 4, at 148. 
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structions preceding the drafting process result from discus-
sions that have taken place in one language only and are them-
selves drafted in that language will be detectable by interpret-
ers, who will accordingly tend to attach more weight in their 
approach to the statute to the version drafted in the language of 
the ministerial instructions.45 
The process of ordering both versions in terms of their reli-
ability or persuasive weight is rarely apparent in case law, be-
cause it contravenes the equal authenticity principle, but it is 
not completely absent.  In one of the leading cases on the inter-
pretation of bilingual legislation, R. v. Compagnie Immobilière 
B.C.N., the Supreme Court compared the wording of the French 
and English versions of a federal tax regulation.46  At the time, 
the French version of those regulations as well as the French 
version of the Income Tax Act47 were translations of the original 
English version.  In giving precedence to the English version, 
the Court underlined the fact that, while the English version of 
the Act used consistently the same words in relation to the 
problem before the Court,48 the French version used different 
words in a seemingly arbitrary fashion.49  This was sufficient to 
suggest that the French version, although official, was unreli-
able and should not prevail in cases of conflict with the English 
version. 
More recently, the Supreme Court issued its first decision in-
terpreting the new Québec Civil Code50 in the case of Doré v. 
Verdun (City of).51  Section 2930 of the Code contained a diver-
gence between the French and English versions.52  The Québec 
Court of Appeal had given precedence to the French version.53  
  
 45. See id. 
 46. R. v. Compagnie Immobilière B.C.N, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865. 
 47. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. ch. 148 (1952)(Can.). 
 48. See Compagnie Immobilière B.C.N, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865, 870–77 (dis-
cussing the expressions “disposition,” “proceeds of disposition,” and “disposed 
of”).   
 49. Id. at 871–74 (noting that in section 20 of the English version of the 
Income Tax Act, the expression “disposed of” appeared thirteen times.  In 
seven of those occurrences, the French equivalent was “disposé," and in six, 
“aliéne.”) 
 50. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. ch. 64 (1991)(Can.) 
 51. Doré v. Verdun (City of), [1997] 2 R.C.S 862.  
 52. Id. at 880. 
 53. Id. at 878–79. 
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As one of the reasons for this choice, the appellate judge stated 
that the English version of the Code was “merely a translation” 
of the original French version, a translation that “did not meet 
with everyone’s approval” and suggested that it should not be 
given equal weight because of its unreliability, citing the well 
known Italian aphorism: Traduttore, traditore (Translator, trai-
tor).54  This approach was clearly rejected by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, where Mr. Justice Gonthier, while acknowledging 
that it was “unfortunately true” that the English version of the 
Code was a translation, stated that this fact could not be used 
to set aside an argument based on that version because to do so 
would be incompatible with the equal authenticity and equal 
status of both versions mandated by the Constitution.55 
The fact that a version does not appear to be as reliable as 
the other because it is a translation is probably not the only cir-
cumstance where unequal bilingualism may be encountered.  
Some areas of Canadian law are inextricably linked by history 
with one language and even if both linguistic versions are 
drafted as originals, one version will tend to dominate.  Accord-
ing to professor (and now dean) Nicholas Kasirer of McGill Uni-
versity, “the Anglo-Canadian tradition in criminal law is deeply 
rooted in the English language” and the application of the equal 
authenticity principle in this area of Canadian law “is a myth 
that no-one really believes, but that everyone swears by.”56  
Québec criminal lawyers are quite aware of this, and colleagues 
who teach criminal law in French tell me that they feel the Eng-
lish version of criminal legislation tends to dominate even in 
the French-speaking interpretive environment.   
Considerations of fairness may also impact on the weight 
given to a linguistic version of a statute.  For example, Cana-
dian Law recognizes the importance of giving citizens fair notice 
as to what conduct is prohibited under pain of criminal pen-
alty.57  Canadian Constitutional Law also considers that lack of 
  
 54. Verdun (City of) v. Doré, [1995] R.J.Q. 1321 at para. 24.  
 55. Doré v. Verdun (City of), [1997] 2 R.C.S. 862, 878–79. 
 56. Nicholas Kasirer, The Annotated Criminal Code en Version Québécoise: 
Signs of Territoriality in Canadian Criminal Law, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 520, 553 
(1990).  
 57. See generally R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686. 
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fair notice may invalidate a statute that is excessively vague.58  
In a criminal trial, if the version drafted in the language of the 
accused does not reveal an offense while the other does, a judge 
might well feel justified, on grounds of fairness, in giving prece-
dence to the version the accused, his lawyer, the jury, and even-
tually, the judge himself, are able to read and understand.   
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently decided a case 
from Québec59 where the French version of the Criminal Code 
described an offense more narrowly than the English one, with 
the result that the conduct of the accused could be seen as being 
prohibited by the English version, but not by the version 
drafted in the language of the accused, a French-speaking resi-
dent of Québec City.  Even though, in the opinion of the Court, 
the English version best reflected Parliamentary intent and the 
French version contained a drafting error, the French version 
was preferred, essentially on grounds of fairness.60 
II. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the state of bilingual interpretation of statutes 
in Canada seems to be a cause for concern.  The recommended 
method for giving meaning to bilingual statutes appears to be 
rarely followed in everyday legal practice. I believe, however, 
that this situation, though it could certainly be made better, is 
understandable. 
First, it must be remembered that bilingual drafting of stat-
utes reflects a constitutional or legal policy of making written 
law equally accessible to English-speaking and French-speaking 
Canadians.  Equal authenticity says to members of both lan-
guage-groups that they are entitled to rely on the version writ-
ten in their own language.  Bilingual drafting is premised on 
the fact that a majority of Canadians are either French or Eng-
lish-speaking and suggests that members of both language 
groups are entitled to rely exclusively on the version drafted in 
their own language.   
The principles developed by the courts, however, state that 
the best way to give meaning to a bilingual statute is to take 
  
 58. See generally R. v. Pharmaceutical Society (Nova Scotia), [1992] 2 
S.C.R. 606. 
 59. R. v. Daoust, [2004] S.C.C. 6.  
 60. See id. at paras. 35 and 37. 
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both versions as a starting point, which requires some degree of 
bilingualism on the part of the interpreter. One cannot fault the 
courts for arriving at the conclusion that the best and most 
prudent way to interpret bilingual legislation is to give equal 
consideration to both texts.  How could they decide otherwise?  
The idea that the language of the parties would determine 
which version the courts should consider in giving meaning to a 
text is untenable, because it means that in the case of discrep-
ancies, there would in fact be two valid rules that could be con-
structed from a single provision, and, furthermore, that these 
rules would apply differently depending on the language spoken 
by the Canadian in question.   
Is there a way to reconcile the reality of a mainly unilingual 
legal profession with the requirements of institutional bilin-
gualism?  Maybe the solution is to think of the judge-made 
principles relating to the interpretation of bilingual statutes not 
as stating conditions for an interpretation to be valid, but as 
simply suggesting the best way to proceed.  Interpretation by 
the Courts and interpretation in day-to-day legal practice take 
place under vastly different conditions.  The constraints of time, 
money and limited human resources and skills that character-
ize everyday or routine interpretations are rarely present in 
judicial interpretation, especially at the highest levels. 
For example, Canadian courts have recently accepted the 
view that examining Parliamentary or legislative history is an 
appropriate way of interpreting statutes, as it may give useful 
insights into the context surrounding the adoption of a given 
text.  One can certainly assert that an interpretation which 
takes into account the Parliamentary history of a provision is to 
be preferred to one that ignores it, but this does not justify the 
conclusion that an interpretation which is arrived at without 
having resort to this kind of information is necessarily invalid 
or improper.  The same could be said for a great number of ele-
ments that are considered relevant to the interpretation of a 
statute, like the previous state of the law, the content of related 
legislation and doctrinal writings on the interpretation of a spe-
cific provision.  
All information comes with a cost, and practitioners will tend 
to balance this cost against the perceived advantages provided 
by the information eventually obtained.  The result of this bal-
ancing operation will evidently vary widely based on circum-
stances.  From judicial interpretation, especially at the appel-
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late level, we expect the best level of information to be brought 
to bear on the results, and a lawyer preparing a factum for the 
Supreme Court of Canada on the interpretation of a statutory 
provision would be well advised not to ignore any element con-
sidered relevant by the Court, including, evidently, the two ver-
sions of the statute.   
This situation is very different from what happens in routine 
interpretations during daily legal practice.  The constraints of 
everyday practice simply do not allow for the gathering of the 
same quantity of information as what may be considered to be 
the best.  Practitioners must often be content with a satisfac-
tory level of information, with what is “good enough” as opposed 
to what is best.  More often that not, this may mean that only 
one version of a bilingual statute will be considered, but when 
the meaning of that version seems in need of confirmation or 
clarification, the other will be consulted if the cost of doing so is 
perceived to be reasonable in comparison with the advantages.  
This cost will vary, notably, with the linguistic skills of the in-
terpreter and whether the other version is easily accessible.  
The perceived advantages will depend in particular on the value 
the environment in which the interpretation occurs places on a 
bilingual approach to statutes. 
Mainly because of the linguistic characteristics of the inter-
preters and of the working habits of the legal profession, the 
assignment of meaning to bilingual statutes in Canada is, in my 
opinion, only exceptionally done by a systematic and careful 
examination of both French and English versions. The gulf be-
tween theory and practice thus runs deep and, given the obsta-
cles in the way of a truly bilingual approach to statutes in eve-
ryday legal practice, there is little reason to believe that this 
situation will change significantly in the foreseeable future, de-
spite the real efforts of the Supreme Court of Canada to pro-
mote such a change.   
 
 
 
